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Topic: "Mother of all..." errors, Revisionists flawed logic< Next Oldest | Next Newest >
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David Aiken Search for posts by this member.
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PostIcon Posted on: Nov. 13 2005,1:33   Ignore posts   

Aloha All,
There are several kinds of Pearl Harbor revisionists... but the most vocal and most flawed are those who say President Roosevelt knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor before it happened...and LET it happen. Not just that war was coming, but the actual attack on Pearl Harbor...and LET it happen.

What follows is Phil Jacobsen's excellent rebuttal of the current series of charges by revisionists.

Oct 16, 3:19 pm, Phil Jacobsen:  

Again, we have heard from Mark Willey but only in more unsupported "blue sky" allegations. What are the sources of these new charges that even have escaped all the prior revisionists like Toland, Stinnett, Wilford et. al.? The fact that Mark refuses to provide any citations to documents that could be checked to verify these hit and run missiles is telling. Anyone can say anything, but "Where is the beef?" There is none here.


ITEM ONE: Clearly, Striking Force Operations Order No. 1 is merely a reminder of the allocation of broad frequency bands when the strict radio silence provisions of the Annex to Combined Fleet Secret Operations Order No. 1 no longer applied. This would be upon the attack of Pearl Harbor on 8 December 1941 Tokyo time. In fact, almost all the radio transmissions then were on high frequencies. Only an aircraft in trouble was noted on a low frequency. So much for Alert Control (long wave) being used when no ship is within 50 miles per Willey. The provisions of the above order from the CinC, Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (and its citation to National Archives records) has been provided and cannot be disputed. This order from on high mandates
strict radio silence of all frequencies not just high frequencies. All the verbal gymnastics by Roosevelt "haters" won't change that order that is etched in stone.


Now we are suppose to believe that the Captain Hasegawa Kiichi of the Akagi (who was killed during the war) admitted in his diary that he violated the strict radio silence order of Admiral Yamamoto on one occasion. Please, provide a proper citation to this long belated and highly questionable diary allegation. Curiously, neither Toland, Stinnett or Wilford has ever mentioned this diary or that allegation. If no citation is forthcoming, we can dispense with that charge.


Besides the twelve testimonies of Strike Force officials that strict radio silence was maintained, we have the war diaries of the CarDiv 5 and BatDiv 3 that confirm that no Strike Force vessel transmitted by radio. See Goldstein and Dillon, "Pearl Harbor Papers, pp. 220-252, 253-263. Also see the official Japanese after battle report, "Lessons of the Sea Battle off Hawaii Vol. 1 1(a) contained in "Pearl Harbor Papers" pp. 280-282. "The success of the surprise operation was attributed to the following factors: ... 4. Concealment of the plan. ... STRICT RADIO SILENCE. In order to keep strict radio silence thorough steps such as taking off fuses in the circuit, holding and sealing the keys were taken. During the operation, the strictest radio silence was perfectly carried out."


ITEM TWO. The Roosevelt "haters" seem to be confused as to the classification process. Decrypts of JN-25B messages are automatically classified as Top Secret upon decryption/translation. Raw Japanese naval messages were automatically classified as Confidential upon being copied and entered in the distribution system. Therefore, whether Mark
is talking about JN-25B decrypts or raw intercepted messages, they were already originally classified by the U.S. Navy in the forties. NSA's task was to declassify documents according to existing regulations, not to classify them. As to the raw JN-25B messages, they were all automatically destroyed after the war and are not available to NSA or
the National Archives. One exception is the microfilm copies of JN-25B messages intercepted by Station B - Guam that were microfilmed to expedite forwarding. However, these microfilms only cover the period 1 January 1941 through 30 June 1941 and therefore are of no special interest to anyone now.  They are available in Archives II for any and all that are willing to track them down and spin reels to their hearts content. So let's dispense with this old worn out "hidden document" allegation.


ITEM THREE. Grogan of the SS Lurline and his misidentified signals. This will be a separate posting of this issue due to its length even though only some of the misquotations, misinterpretations, omissions and horrendous conflicts of the four accountings of Grogan's ramblings can be covered here. Again, for a complete debunking of revisionist accounts of Grogan's "sea story" see my article, "Pearl Harbor: Radio Officer Leslie Grogan of the SS Lurline and his Misidentified Signals" "Cryptologia" April 2005.


NSA made three main releases. The first one was the RG457 CCH series which were mainly SRH/SRMN histories and the 1945-47 decrypts/translantions that were of some relevance to Pearl Harbor and the commencement of the war. Similarly, PHLO documents were released under RG80. Later, NSA made a huge release of RG457 "Open Door" series. Finally, the U.S. naval material held at Crane, Indiana was released under RG38. However, John Taylor gave a few anointed few an
advance look at these documents including Robert B. Stinnett. Then, they were withdrawn, cataloged and after about a year they were put out for the general public. I am not aware of any important cryptologic documents that have been declassified and released since then. Again, the devil is in the details. Examples please.


ITEM FOUR/CONCLUSION. Army and Navy Boards of Inquiry were not courts of law. There were no courts-martial for Kimmel and Short. The boards were given the task of investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor and making findings as to culpability for possible action by higher authorities. Let's get our terminology straight.


RECAP. No revisionist conspiracy theorist has even provided specific evidence of a single radio transmission by the Japanese Strike Force from its movement from the Inland Sea or other home ports until the reconnaissance air craft of the two cruisers radioed their report as to the disposition of ships at Pearl Harbor while the attack aircraft had already been launched on 8 December 1941 Tokyo time.. Furthermore, no
revisionist conspiracy theorist has ever provided specific evidence that any U.S. Navy direction finder station obtained any bearings on Strike Force units from the time they left the Inland Sea or other home ports until after the attack on Pearl Harbor had been commenced. Ogg backtracked on what Toland reported in "Infamy" and revisionist claims have been debunked in my article, "No RDF on the Japanese Strike Force: No Conspiracy!" "Intelligence and Counter Intelligence" Spring 2005.


If anyone disputes this statement, please provide the frequency, call signs and time of the alleged violation of radio silence. Please do not list the Number-Kana-Kana drill/exercise callsigns that Station C - Corregidor obtained bearings on which were radio deception transmissions emanating from the Sasebo and Kure naval bases and were reported in TESTM's messages to Station H - Heeia. All those bearings (026 and 030 degrees) point to Sasebo and Kure when the established deviation of Corregidor's direction finder is applied. They do not point to Hitokappu Bay or the North Pacific Ocean. For
example, Stinnett does not mention the Corregidor bearing of 030 degrees (Kure) on 8YUNA on 4 December when the Akagi was in the North Pacific and the bearing should have been about 054 degrees if it were a bona fide transmission from the Akagi. Stinnett also did not mention the bearings of 030 degrees (Kure) on the 8YUNA (Akagi) and 9RUSI (Hiryu) on 28 November which should have been much greater than 030 two days out of Hitokappu Bay. Clearly, these and all the other Corregidor bearings were on radio deception transmissions from Sasebo (026 degrees) and Kure (030 degrees). Similarly, the Corregidor bearing of 030 degrees on 1KIRA (Zuikaku) on 23 November was more radio deception
emanating from the Kure naval base, not the east coast of Japan. See my article, "Pearl Harbor: Who Deceived Whom? "Naval History" December 2003. It is also galling that Stinnett refers to these single line bearings on radio deception transmissions as "fixes." A "fix" is a location using three or more bearings. Clearly, no "fixes" were ever obtained either. See "Day of Deceit" pp. 52.


For your information, Stinnett in "Day of Deceit" pp. 52, 155
misidentified SASO2 as Carrier Division One for November. SASO2 was unidentified in the HYOO-9 call sign book which was effective only for the month of November. After the call sign change on 1 December, SASO2 was identified as CarDiv1 in the HYOO-10 call sign book effective through 9 April 1942 Therefore, Stinnett's claim that Nagumo transmitted by radio on 24 November using the call sign SASO2 is false. That radio transmission was from a non-Strikeforce unit and pointed to
the Yokosuka area (040 degrees).

In addition, Stinnett made another horrible error. On pp. 155-156, he claims that the Commander of Carrier Division Five filed a movement report from Hitokappu Bay on 25 November. However, the movement report referred to in Station H's Chronology was for the call sign NAO0 which was unidentified for the month of November. The correct call sign for CdrCarDiv5 for November was NAO4 a completely different unit. Here we have another false claim by Stinnett that a unit of the Strike Force broke the mandatory radio silence edict of Admiral Yamamoto. Furthermore, CdrCarDiv5 was in the company of the CinC First Air Fleet well before 25 November and he remained within the First Air Fleet's Floating Communication Zone until long after the attack on Pearl
Harbor. So, CdrCarDiv5 did not move his communication zone on or about 25 November and would not have sent a movement report at that time.


Stinnett also falsely claimed that Merrill Whiting "heard a third
Japanese sub, TAYU88, when it filed a movement report to the communications zone of the flagship, First Air Fleet." Whiting copied that message when it was relayed on the Tokyo Fleet Broadcast and did not hear the original transmission by the submarine as Stinnett alleged. In fact, the submarine was in port at Yokosuka and undoubted
filed that message by messenger or visual means so that message was not sent originally by radio. See "Day of Deceit" p. 57.


The Station H Chronology and COMSUM14 reports that carriers were communicating on a tactical frequency and the Akagi was communicating with Maru's on 26 and 30 November respectively were radio deception transmissions. Corregidor obtained a bearing of 027 degrees on the 30 November transmission using the drill call sign for the Akagi (8YUNA)
which placed the COMSUM14 report as emanating from Sasebo. Thus, confirming that it was a part of the extensive Japanese radio deception program.

There were no violations of the mandatory strict radio silence and consequently no valid RDF bearings were obtained on the Strike force.

Therefore, no conspiracy!  

pjacobsen


--------------
Cheers,

David Aiken, a Director
Pearl Harbor History Associates, Inc.

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